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INTRODUCTION 
The law of search and seizure is built on flexible standards of 
reasonableness, transformed by courts into bright-line rules that balance the 
needs of law enforcement against the degree to which a particular police 
practice intrudes upon individual privacy interests. The third-party doctrine 
is one such rule, holding that police do not need a Fourth Amendment 
warrant to access information that an individual has voluntarily disclosed or 
conveyed to a third party, such as bank records or call histories. But the 
third-party doctrine is quite literally the product of another era—before 
ubiquitous networked computing, digital data, electronic communications, 
mobile technologies, and the commodification of information. Today, the 
digital devices that facilitate our daily participation in modern society are 
connected through automated infrastructures that are designed to generate 
vast quantities of data, nearly all of which are captured, utilized, and stored 
by third-party service providers. Under a plain reading of the third-party 
doctrine, however, the substantial majority of that data receives no Fourth 
Amendment protection—no matter how sensitive or revealing the 
information. 
It is generally agreed that the balance struck in the third-party doctrine 
is no longer reasonable, as it fails to account for the far greater degree of 
privacy intrusion occasioned by warrantless government access to all of this 
personal data. Acknowledging that current approaches fail to adequately 
account for rapid advancements in information technology and analytics, 
the Supreme Court has responded in several recent cases by creating specific, 
narrow exceptions to the third-party doctrine for certain devices and data. 
But in the absence of a more generalized and coherent approach, lower 
courts have struggled to understand and apply these cases to other 
technologies and types of data, leading to uneven and often contradictory 
results. 
This Article proposes a new analytical framework for adapting the 
third-party doctrine to the new-information environment. Drawing on the 
Court’s recent decisions, this Article advances a three-step approach for the 
development of workable, bright-line rules governing the search and seizure 
of different categories of data. It identifies both guiding principles and 
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competing interests, as well as the specific factors to be considered in 
assessing the legitimacy and relative strength of those interests. It then 
explains the relationship between those factors and their role in the 
balancing process that produces appropriate and workable rules. The goal is 
to provide a consistent, practical framework to be applied more generally 
across the different categories of data generated by digital technologies and 
services. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I identifies the public/private 
distinction as the dominant principle and primary limit on the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protections. I argue that the enduring and influential 
facet of Katz v. United States1 is not Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” test2 but rather the majority’s distinction between that which “a 
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . [and] what he seeks to preserve 
as private.”3 I explore the origins of this public/private distinction in the 
“public exposure” and “third-party disclosure” cases, its use in 
subordination of property interests, and its consequential extension to the 
third-party doctrine. This discussion helps to establish the significance of the 
Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Jones (2012),4 Riley v. California 
(2014),5 and Carpenter v. United States (2018).6 
Part II argues that Jones, Riley, and Carpenter subvert the dominant role 
of the public/private distinction, with significant implications for the third-
party doctrine. Third-party disclosure is transformed from a bright-line rule 
into a single element of a broader balancing test, in which an individual’s 
privacy interest in a particular category of information is weighed against the 
diminishing effect of disclosure or conveyance. In some cases, those privacy 
interests will be weighty enough to overcome the third-party disclosure and 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections will therefore apply.  
In Part III, I propose an analytical framework to be applied by lower 
courts in developing workable, bright-line rules governing the search and 
seizure of the different categories of data. First, I identify four key factors to 
be applied in the analysis: pervasive devices and information services; 
1 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
3 Id. at 351–52 (1967) (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
4 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
5 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
6 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
1552 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1549 
automated data generation and collection; the nature of the metadata 
generated and collected; and the linking of that metadata to the “privacies of 
life.”7 Second, I propose a three-step analysis that begins by determining the 
strength and legitimacy of an individual’s privacy interest in the information 
sought by the government. Here, the court examines both the possibility and 
probability that the category of data sought by the government will reveal 
sensitive information. Possibility simply refers to a direct and reliable link 
between the data and the sensitive information, i.e., the ability to derive 
information from the data. Probability is assessed on a sliding scale that 
considers both the precision/detail and amount/density of the data. In 
addition, individuals are likely to have a stronger privacy interest in large sets 
of historical, retrospective data. Next, the court determines the extent to 
which disclosure or conveyance of personal information to a third party 
diminishes that privacy interest. In making this determination, the court 
considers both the extent to which the device or service generating the data 
is a necessity to participation in a modern society and the user’s practical 
ability to control the conveyance of data to a third party during the use of 
that device or service. Finally, the court balances the individual privacy 
interest against the diminishing effect of third-party disclosure, using 
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles to guide its evaluation. In the 
final Section of Part III, the proposed framework is tested by application to 
other automated technologies and metadata sets, using real-time cell phone 
location tracking and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses as examples. 
I.  THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION: FROM KATZ TO THE THIRD-PARTY 
DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause.”8 Reading the Amendment’s substantive and 
procedural clauses as connected, the Supreme Court held that searches and 
seizures undertaken without first securing a warrant are presumptively 
7  Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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unreasonable.9 This presumption may be overcome, however, in two 
common circumstances: first, on the front end, by demonstrating that no 
search or seizure occurred and thus no warrant was required;10 or second, 
on the back end, by showing that a warrantless search or seizure was 
nevertheless reasonable because it “falls within a specific exception to the 
warrant requirement.”11 
In the first of these circumstances, the key question is how one 
determines whether a “search” has occurred within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. For much of the twentieth century, the “liberty and 
privacy rights” secured by the Fourth Amendment “were understood largely 
in terms of property rights,”12 but evolving societal practices and 
advancements in technology led the Court to adopt a more flexible standard 
intended to expand the concept of a Fourth Amendment search. In 
describing this shift, the conventional narrative focuses on two paradigmatic 
cases, Olmstead v. United States13 and Katz v. United States.14 In this 
simplified telling, the Katz decision is characterized as a fault line in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—introducing an entirely new standard that 
replaces Olmstead’s rigid, property-based safeguards with more flexible, 
expansive, privacy-based protections.15 These are mere caricatures, however, 
obscuring the emergence of a more demanding standard that, rather than 
 9 See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant 
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 541–43 (1997) (discussing the 
relationship between Fourth Amendment warrants and reasonableness, and the Supreme Court’s 
asserted preference for the traditional warrant requirement); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 
(“[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable . . . [unless they] fall[] within a specific exception to 
the warrant requirement.” (citation omitted)). 
 10 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether or 
not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”). 
11 Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (citation omitted). 
 12 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239 (quoting Morgan Cloud, Property Is Privacy: Locke and Brandeis in 
the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 42 (2018)). 
13 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
14 389 U.S. 347. 
 15 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1(b) (5th ed. 2019) (observing that “it is no overstatement to say, as the commentators 
have asserted, that Katz ‘marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence’ because the Court 
‘purported to clean house on outmoded fourth amendment principles’ and moved ‘toward a 
redefinition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment’” (internal citation omitted)). 
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expanding the concept of a Fourth Amendment search, sharply limits 
privacy protections for those engaged in modern information society. 
A. Katz v. United States: The Conventional Telling
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
limited application of the warrant requirement to a narrow class of 
government actions constituting a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. A search was said to occur only where enforcement 
officers “obtain[] information by physically intruding on a constitutionally 
protected area.”16 These protected areas were limited to property in which 
the targeted individual held an ownership or possessory interest, while 
physical intrusion required that officers commit common-law trespass upon 
property.17 Olmstead provides the canonical example. In that case, the 
defendants spoke with one another using landline telephones located within 
the privacy of their respective homes18—an area at the “very core” of the 
Fourth Amendment.19 Law enforcement officials intercepted these 
conversations by placing taps on telephone lines located immediately 
outside the homes on nearby streets.20 The Court held that no Fourth 
Amendment search had occurred because placement of the taps did not 
require the officers to physically enter the defendants’ homes—i.e., “without 
trespass upon any property of the defendants.”21 Moreover, the oral 
conversations transcribed by federal officers were not the type of tangible 
16 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 17 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s “close connection to property”); 
id. (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter 
half of the 20th century.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))); see also Nita A. 
Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1244–46 (2012) (observing that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is grounded in property concepts); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (referencing 
the historic connection between Fourth Amendment protections and trespass upon property). 
18 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456. 
19 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (stating that “the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 
‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the 
origins of the Republic.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980))). 
20 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57. 
21 Id. at 457, 466. 
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objects that are protected from search or seizure.22 In the absence of a search, 
no warrant was required.23  
Justice Brandeis, writing in dissent, recognized that such a rigid 
approach would create opportunities for evasion. He cautioned that 
technological advancement would bring “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching 
means of invading privacy” without physical intrusion and in the absence of 
trespass, the government would be able “to expose . . . the most intimate 
occurrences of the home” without implicating constitutional safeguards.24 
In Katz,25 the Court sought to rectify the shortcomings of the Olmstead 
approach by extending the concept of private spaces beyond formal property 
lines, to other areas and situations in which an individual enjoys a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.26 The material facts of the case were fairly similar to 
those presented in Olmstead. Law enforcement agents had “attached an 
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of . . . [an enclosed] 
public telephone booth” commonly used by Katz to conduct a gambling 
operation.27 Applying the Olmstead analysis, the court of appeals held that 
no search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
because Katz’s conversations had been obtained without law enforcement 
physically entering the area occupied by the defendant.28 But the Supreme 
Court abruptly reversed course—rejecting Olmstead’s rigid, property-based 
approach in favor of a more flexible analysis of individual privacy interests. 
It is commonly understood that the persistent standard to emerge from 
Katz came not from the majority opinion but from Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence.29 Building off the majority’s holding that property interests no  
22 Id. at 466. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
25 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
26 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012) (describing the shift in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), from the “exclusively property-based approach” to the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” approach). 
27 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
28 Id. at 348–49. 
 29 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (discussing the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard in Katz). 
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longer control the analysis,30 Harlan concluded that a search instead occurs 
when government officials violate an individual’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”31 The latter interest requires “first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”32 
Applying that standard, the Court found that “an enclosed telephone booth 
is an area where, like a home . . . a person has a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”33 Moreover, the Court held that a 
cognizable intrusion upon that privacy interest may occur “by electronic as 
well as physical invasion.”34 It was therefore immaterial that the electronic 
surveillance device used in this case did not penetrate the walls of the 
telephone booth.35 Finally, the Court affirmed that Fourth Amendment 
protections are not limited to the seizure of tangible items but also apply to 
intangible interests, such as private oral conversations.36 
When Katz was first decided, “commentators believed this formulation 
would expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”37 But the reality of 
post-Katz jurisprudence proved significantly more complex than this 
conventional narrative suggests. With the end of the Warren Court in the 
late 1960s, the Court’s expansive understanding of Katz began almost 
immediately to erode on multiple fronts. Although the Court had apparently 
forsaken rigid, property-based rules in favor of more flexible standards, it 
had not abandoned its strong preference for workable, bright-line rules.38 
30
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan indicated that he “join[ed] the opinion of 
the Court,” but then explained what he took that opinion to mean. Because lower courts 
attempting to interpret and apply Katz quickly came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as 
ultimately did a majority of the Supreme Court . . . . 
LAFAVE, supra note 15. 
31 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 361. 
33 Id. at 360. 
34 Id. at 362. 
35 Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
36 Id. 
37 Christopher Slobogin, Distinguished Lecture: Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1105, 1111 (2009); see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, 
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 330 (1998). 
 38 See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) (5th ed. 2019); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
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Amid this tension, the Court found it difficult to commit to the case-by-case, 
contextual approach suggested by Katz. The Court was unable to shake its 
conception of privacy as “a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not 
at all.”39  
It is now commonly argued that Katz effectively reframed the Fourth 
Amendment analysis but without significantly altering its substance. The 
Court, favoring clear guidelines, has continued to privilege property 
ownership and possessory interests in its analysis of privacy expectations.40 
And indeed, the Court has acknowledged as much, holding that “one who 
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”41 But this 
observation, although generally correct as a matter of outcome, obscures a 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 861–62 (2004) 
(positing “rule clarity” as a goal of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 581–82 (2009) (“The on/off switch of the suppression 
remedy demands clear Fourth Amendment rules on what police conduct triggers Fourth Amendment 
protection and what police conduct does not.”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an 
Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–27 (1982) 
(setting forth various factors to consider when determining whether to adopt bright-line rules in the 
Fourth Amendment context); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth 
Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2008) (arguing in favor of “clear 
rules” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
39 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748–49 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 40 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy 
by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the 
main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses 
or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right 
to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based 
on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These 
ideas were rejected both in Jones and Katz. But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts 
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984). In Carpenter, the 
majority opinion and each of the four dissenting opinions reaffirmed the connection between Fourth 
Amendment protections and trespass-upon-property. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14; id. at 2227 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Katz did not abandon reliance on property-based concepts.”); id. at 2235–
36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting Katz, 389 U.S. 347, in favor of a property-based approach); id. at 
2260 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith, 442 
U.S. 735, as turning on the defendants’ lack of property rights in the property of another); id. at 2267–
71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a return to property concepts might resolve difficulties 
arising in regard to the third-party doctrine). 
41 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
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more broadly significant and enduring facet of the Katz analysis: the central 
role of the public/private distinction in limiting the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
B. Revisiting Katz: The Public/Private Distinction
The Katz analysis is best understood as an amalgam of the majority 
opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence, read as an integrated whole. Four 
related points are particularly salient. First, a Fourth Amendment “search” 
occurs when the government (a) impermissibly intrudes (b) upon a 
legitimate privacy interest (c) in order to obtain information.42 Second, 
legitimate privacy interests are not to be rigidly defined by property 
ownership or possessory interests, but rather by employing Harlan’s two-
pronged “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.43 Third, in applying 
this standard, both the majority opinion and Harlan’s concurrence make an 
essential distinction between public exposure and the preservation of 
privacy. The majority holds that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”44 Harlan 
makes a similar distinction, differentiating between “a man’s home . . . a 
place where he expects privacy” and “objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.”45 Likewise, conversations that take 
place in “an enclosed telephone booth” away from “the uninvited ear” are 
protected, while “conversations in the open” are not.46 Finally, as these 
examples suggest, the public/private distinction is often defined by reference 
to concealment within private areas or places.47 This focus on concealment 
ensured that property interests, although not controlling, remain a 
significant consideration.  
 42 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961)). 
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
44 Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
45 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
46 Id. at 352, 360–61 (majority opinion and then Harlan, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Viewed in isolation, Katz appeared at first to dramatically expand the 
concept of a Fourth Amendment search by decoupling individual privacy 
interests from the rigid limits of real and personal property. In place of this 
property approach, the Court adopted a contextual analysis of both an 
individual’s subjective expectations and society’s willingness to recognize 
those expectations as reasonable. This more flexible approach had the effect, 
in at least some cases, of extending protection beyond those areas 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment and into the public sphere; here, a 
public telephone booth.48  
But this new flexible, contextual approach proved difficult to apply. 
The “unjust”49 certainty of Olmstead had merely been replaced with the 
impractical uncertainty of Katz. It is this uncertainty—so at odds with the 
Court’s preference for workable, bright-line rules—that precipitated the 
emergence of the binary public/private distinction as a dominant limit on 
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.  
The public/private distinction is rooted in two distinct strands of pre-
Katz case law. The first involves the exposure of evidence to the prying eyes 
and ears of the public, and by extension to law enforcement personnel 
(public exposure). The other addresses the disclosure of information to a 
particular third-party, such as an undercover officer or informant (third-
party disclosure).  
1. The Public Exposure Cases
The first strand of cases involves the exposure of acts, objects, or 
information to the public, even where an individual seeks to seclude himself 
within the bounds of property or through practical obscurity. In the first of 
the public exposure cases cited in Katz, United States v. Lee,50 a Coast Guard 
patrol boat followed suspected bootlegger, Lee, to a rendezvous point 
twenty-four miles from land.51 Using a searchlight to illuminate the deck of 
the bootlegger’s boat, crew members spotted cases of illegal grain alcohol.52 
48 Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
49 LAFAVE, supra note 15. 
50 274 U.S. 559 (1927). 
51 Id. at 560. 
52 Id. at 560–61. 
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This led them to board the vessel and ultimately to Lee’s arrest.53 Despite the 
bootleggers’ attempts to seclude their activities by retreating to the middle of 
the ocean, the Court held that no search had taken place within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, because the contraband had been left exposed to 
observers.54 In reaching its conclusion, the Lee court relied on Hester v. 
United States,55 in which revenue officers crossed onto private land owned 
by the defendant’s family for the purpose of conducting surveillance.56 From 
their position in defendant’s “open fields,” the officers observed the 
defendant and an accomplice handling contraband in plain view.57 The 
Court held, first, that the trespass itself did not constitute a search, because 
“the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to . . . ‘persons, 
houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.”58 And second, 
as in Lee, the “defendant’s own acts” exposed incriminating evidence to 
onlookers.59  
The next case cited in Katz, Rios v. United States,60 distinguishes these 
public exposure cases from those in which the individual seeks to conceal his 
conversations and property.61 The underlying facts, although disputed, 
generally involved “[a] passenger who [let] a package drop to the floor of the 
taxicab in which he [was] riding.”62 Differentiating between concealment in 
a private vehicle on the one hand and exposure or abandonment on the 
other, the Court held that “[a]n occupied taxicab is not to be compared to an 
open field . . . or a vacated hotel room.”63 Finally, in Ex parte Jackson,64 the 
Court drew a clear line between sealed letters and packages “intended to be 
kept free from inspection . . . except as to their outward form” and other 
types of printed matter “purposely left in a condition to be examined,” such 
53 Id. at 560. 
 54 Id. at 563 (holding that the use of a spotlight to inspect the boat was no different than “the use of 
a marine glass or a field glass”). 
55 Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
56 Hester, 265 U.S. at 58–59. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 58. 
60 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
61 Id. at 261–62, 262 n.6. 
62 Id. at 261–62. 
63 Id. at 262 n.6 (citations omitted). 
64 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
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as newspapers and magazines.65 In making this distinction, the Court 
analogized sealed letters and packages to the objects located within the 
senders’ “own domiciles”66—safeguarding that which is concealed from both 
the public and government officials. 
These cases illuminate a key aspect of the public/private distinction, 
drawing a line between seclusion and concealment. On the one hand, these 
cases affirm that “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” stands at “the very core” 
of the Fourth Amendment67—such that acts, objects, or information 
concealed within the home’s interior remain protected. The same is true of 
certain other private areas, such as the taxicab in Rios,68 provided that the 
relevant evidence remains concealed within that space and out of view of the 
public.69 On the other hand, all that occurs outside of these concealed areas 
is deemed to have been “knowingly expos[ed] to the public” and “is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”70 even if, as in Hester, the home 
is secluded from the public by the operation of property law and a 
corresponding right to exclude.71 An officer’s trespass across open fields 
does not immunize that which is knowingly exposed and thus observed.72 
Moreover, even the most drastic efforts to physically isolate oneself or 
obscure illegal activity are generally insufficient to overcome the public 
exposure rule. What is visible—at night, by spotlight, on the open sea, miles 
from shore73—is said to be in plain view, exposed to the public. The apparent 
seclusion provided by private property rights in land or miles of open ocean 
bears little constitutional significance. Although concealment indoors or 
below decks may have been sufficient. 
65 Id. at 733. 
66 Id. 
67 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
68 Rios, 364 U.S. at 261–62. 
69 Id. at 262. 
70 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
71 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924). 
72 Id. 
73 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 560–61 (1927). 
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2. The Third-Party Disclosure Cases
The second strand of cases supporting Katz’s public/private distinction 
are those in which an individual discloses information to a third party—e.g., 
to an undercover officer or informant. The Katz decision cites74 specifically 
to Lewis v. United States,75 in which an undercover narcotics agent was twice 
invited into the suspect’s home to consummate a drug transaction.76 The 
Court acknowledged that “the home is accorded the full range of Fourth 
Amendment protections,”77 and that the agent gained entry to the home 
only by misrepresenting his identity.78 Nevertheless, the Court found that no 
search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.79 Key 
to this conclusion was that on “neither of his visits to petitioner’s home did 
the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact 
intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal business.”80 In other 
words, the suspect had voluntarily disclosed incriminating information and 
physical evidence to a government agent.  
The Lewis Court compared81 this result to its contrary conclusion in 
Gouled v. United States,82 in which an informant secured by subterfuge an 
invitation to the suspect’s office.83 Once inside he “secretly ransacked the 
office and seized certain private papers of an incriminating nature.”84 The 
fundamental difference between Lewis and Gouled was the voluntariness of 
the suspect’s disclosures. In Lewis, the suspect had chosen not only to admit 
the third party to his home, but to provide him with information and 
contraband. In Gouled, only the first of these conditions had been met. The 
suspect had freely admitted the informant to his office but had not willingly 
disclosed anything. It was the involuntary nature of the disclosure that 
established the Fourth Amendment violation. 
74 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
75 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
76 Id. at 207–08. 
77 Id. at 211. 
78 Id. at 206–07. 
79 Id. at 210–11. 
80 Id. at 210. 
81 Id. at 209–10. 
82 255 U.S. 298 (1921), abrogated by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
83 Id. at 304. 
84 Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (describing the facts of Gouled, 255 U.S. 298). 
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The import of these third-party disclosure cases is best understood by 
revisiting the two basic rules that emerged from the public exposure cases. 
First, what is concealed from observation by its location within certain 
private areas (e.g., homes, taxicabs) is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
against search and seizure.85 Second, although enforcement officers may 
trespass on certain forms of private property (e.g., open fields) to better 
observe acts, objects, or information in plain view, they may not physically 
intrude upon the private area itself in order to gain access to that which is 
concealed. Thus, these cases make clear that seclusion within the bounds of 
property86 or through practical obscurity87 is generally insufficient to protect 
oneself from government intrusion—a legitimate privacy interest instead 
requires physical concealment within a limited number of protected private 
areas. 
The third-party disclosure cases maintain the distinction between 
seclusion and concealment, but effectively impose even more stringent 
requirements for legally effective concealment. Thus, an undercover officer 
or informant who is invited to enter an otherwise protected private area has 
not impermissibly intruded within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment—even where the invitation is obtained by misrepresentation.88 
Likewise, once the officer is permissibly located within that private area, the 
observation of acts, conversations, and objects in plain view does not 
constitute a search.89 Moreover, the memorialization or recording of oral 
conversations occurring within the private area is not in itself a seizure of 
that communication.90 In sum, the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
do not apply to the voluntary disclosure of incriminating information or 
physical evidence to any third party who is permissibly located (even if by 
deception) within an otherwise protected private area. Instead, the 
public/private distinction appears to demand absolute concealment within 
a protected private space, in near isolation and silence. 
85 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261–62 (1960). 
86 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924). 
87 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 560–63 (1927). 
88 Lewis, 385 U.S. at 206–07. 
89 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987). 
90 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971). 
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C. After Katz: The Continued Subordination of Property
This brings us back to the prevailing account of post-Katz Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Although Katz reframes the analysis around an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, critics argue that this 
standard remains stubbornly linked to an individual’s interest in property. 
But this critique tends to overstate the correlation. Private property interests 
and the right to exclude are simply one mechanism by which an individual 
may “seek[] to preserve [that which is] private.”91 And it is the private/public 
distinction, rather than the bounds of property, that remains the central 
principle for determining the existence, scope, and degree of Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests. Indeed, a persistent thread running through 
the cases relied upon in Katz is the failure of personal property interests to 
secure privacy protections. A Fourth Amendment privacy interest might be 
created by physical concealment within one of a few select spaces, but retreat 
into seclusion—whether by the legal right to exclude, physical barriers to 
entry, or practical obscurity—fails to provide the same protection.  
This point is exemplified by the Court’s aerial surveillance decisions. In 
California v. Ciraolo,92 for example, Ciraolo was suspected of maintaining a 
marijuana garden within the protected curtilage of his home.93 The garden 
itself was surrounded by a ten-foot fence.94 Ciraolo’s entire yard was 
enclosed by a second, six-foot fence.95 Unable to see the garden from ground 
level, police “secured a private plane and flew over [Ciraolo’s] house at an 
altitude of 1,000 feet.”96 Officers visually identified the marijuana growing in 
Ciraolo’s yard and photographed the area using “a standard 35mm 
camera.”97 In concluding that no search had occurred, the Court held that 
what an officer is able to observe “from a public vantage point where he has 
a right to be” has been “knowingly exposed to the public . . . . [It is] not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection”98—even where the suspect 
91 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
92 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 





98 Id. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
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conducts his activities within a constitutionally protected area and employs 
exceptional measures to shield those activities from public view. In practice, 
therefore, a legitimate expectation of privacy often requires absolute 
concealment within the interior of an enclosed, constitutionally protected 
area, effectively obscured from external observation. 
The public/private distinction has also been applied to justify physical 
trespass upon private property interests. The “open-fields doctrine”99 
provides an example of this corrosive process. The Court has long held that 
a person’s house stands at “the very core of the Fourth Amendment.”100 
Likewise, certain lands immediately adjacent to the dwelling itself (referred 
to as curtilage) are considered to be part of the home for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.101 Physical intrusion upon the house or its curtilage will thus likely 
constitute a search, triggering the presumptive need for a warrant.102 But any 
privately-owned land beyond the narrow bounds of the curtilage is classified 
as open fields, left unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.103 As such, 
physical trespass upon open fields is not considered to be a search,104 and all 
observable acts, objects, and information located there are said to have been 
exposed to the public in plain view.  
This open fields concept has been broadly applied to “any unoccupied 
or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage”105—including, for example, 
“wooded areas, desert, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs, 
and open waters.”106 Individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy 
within these areas, even when privately held, and may not create a legitimate 
expectation by secluding the land with fences, locked gates, and “no 
99 Open-Fields Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the open-fields 
doctrine as “[t]he rule permitting a warrantless search of the area outside a property owner’s curtilage; 
the principle that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything in plain sight”). 
 100 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (brackets omitted). “[T]he Court since the 
Enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home 
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.’” Oliver v. United States 466 
U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 601). 
101 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 176 (holding that the “special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people 
in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.” (quoting Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924))). 
104 Id. at 183. 
105 Id. at 180 n.11. 
106 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 2.4(a). 
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trespassing” signs.107 United States v. Dunn108 provides a somewhat extreme 
example. Dunn owned a 198-acre ranch surrounded by a perimeter fence.109 
The property also contained several interior fences, constructed 
mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire. The ranch 
residence was situated ½ mile from a public road. A fence encircled 
the residence and a nearby small greenhouse. Two barns were 
located approximately 50 yards from this fence. The front of the 
larger of the two barns was enclosed by a wooden fence and had an 
open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates barred entry into the barn 
proper, and netting material stretched from the ceiling to the top 
of the wooden gates.110 
Officers entered Dunn’s private property without a warrant, walking 
hundreds of yards to reach the out-buildings.111 They crossed over the 
perimeter fence, two interior wooden fences, and two barbed wire fences.112 
Finally, standing at the locked gate of the larger barn, officers used a 
flashlight to illuminate the interior of the barn and observed what they 
believed to be a drug lab.113  
Accepting for the sake of argument that the barn enjoyed Fourth 
Amendment protection, the Court nevertheless found that no search had 
taken place.114 The Court determined that the area immediately in front of 
the barn gate was an “open field” outside the curtilage of the house.115 It then 
held that “there is no constitutional difference between police observations 
conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.”116 
The Dunn case illustrates two key points regarding post-Katz 
jurisprudence. First, although Katz eliminated the physical trespass 
requirement as a means of securing privacy against non-intrusive 
surveillance technologies, the practical effect has been to authorize 
government intrusion onto vast swaths of private property. Even the most 
107 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182. 
108 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
109 Id. at 297. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 297–98. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 303–05. 
115 Id. at 304. 
116 Id. 
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extreme efforts to legally and physically seclude oneself within the bounds 
of real property often fail to create a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Property interests are instead merely one factor to be considered in 
determining an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. Second, what an 
officer is able to observe while physically located in open fields or other 
unprotected areas of private property—i.e., outside the residential dwelling 
or its curtilage—is considered to be in plain view of the public (i.e., public 
exposure), including that which an officer is able to observe within the 
interior of dwellings using his natural senses. Thus, the officer’s trespass to 
private property is equated to his presence on land that is open to the public 
or on to which he has been invited by the owner. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
recently affirmed that officers may even enter those areas of curtilage that 
are generally considered open to the public under prevailing social norms, 
provided that they do so for legitimate reasons,117 and that observations 
made from that position using their natural senses may be treated as being 
in plain view.118 
D. A Third-Party Doctrine of Exposure and Disclosure 
As just described, Katz derives the public/private distinction from two 
distinct strands of pre-Katz jurisprudence: the public exposure cases and the 
third-party disclosure cases.119 In public exposure cases, the Court 
emphasizes the material difference between effective concealment and 
efforts to seclude.120 Seclusion relies primarily on private property interests 
and the legal right to exclude to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
creating a buffer zone between individual and observer within which the 
individual is purportedly free to operate in the open.121 Under Katz and its 
progeny, however, it is nearly impossible to establish a legitimate privacy 
117 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (indicating that “the background social norms that invite 
a visitor to the front door do not invite [a police officer] there to conduct a search”); see also id. at 8 
(discussing “the habits of the country,” implied invitations, and licenses). 
 118 Id. at 7–9 (distinguishing between the observations of an officer who merely enters the curtilage 
as “any private citizen might do” and the introduction of a trained police dog for the purpose of 
investigating with heighted senses). 
119 See supra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2. 
120 See supra Section I.B.1. 
121 See supra Section I.B.2. 
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interest solely through legal or physical seclusion.122 Government officials 
are permitted, for example, to trespass upon open fields to observe objects, 
activities, or conversations occurring on or within private property123 and to 
photograph from the air those areas of private property that cannot be seen 
from the ground.124 As a result, a legitimate privacy interest must generally 
be established through effective and absolute concealment within a 
diminishing number of constitutionally protected areas—e.g., within the 
interior of a dwelling house, obscured from external observation.  
As the third-party disclosure cases demonstrate, however, even these 
core concealment protections are subject to exception. Undercover officers 
and informants are permitted, for instance, to gain entrance to an 
individual’s home under false pretenses.125 Once in the home, many of the 
objects, activities, and conversations concealed within its interior and thus 
effectively obscured from external observation are now in plain view or 
hearing of the government’s agent.126 The suspect’s legitimate expectation of 
privacy within the home—a stronghold of retreat and seclusion from public 
life—is no longer justified because he invited a third party into a protected 
space, voluntarily disclosed incriminating information, and assumed the 
risk that the invitee might in turn reveal that information to the 
government.127 In the absence of effective concealment and absolute silence, 
no warrant is required to gather that information.128 Moreover, the 
government is not required to obtain a subpoena or other formal process to 
compel production from these cooperating witnesses. They are free to 
disclose what they know. 
The third-party doctrine129 applies these same principles to personal 
information disclosed to a private individual or institution for the purpose 
of facilitating the provision of goods or services, as opposed to information 
gathered by a government agent or informant in the course of an 
investigation. At the time Katz was decided, these transactional disclosures 
122 See supra Section I.C. 
123 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–05 (1987). 
124 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209–13 (1986). 
125 See supra Section I.B.2. 
126 See supra Sections I.B.2, I.C. 
127 See supra Section I.B.2. 
128 See supra Section I.C. 
129 The third-party doctrine refers to the “principle that one has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information that one has voluntarily disclosed to one or more third parties.” Third-Party 
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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generally represented a small universe of confidential relationships in which 
sensitive information (e.g., health, financial) would be entrusted to a third-
party professional (e.g., doctor, banker) for a limited purpose and then 
retained as a business record. Outside the context of the underlying 
confidential relationship, however, this same information might prove 
valuable to law and regulatory enforcement. To what extent is this 
information protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement? 
The Supreme Court addressed this precise question in the first of two 
principal cases establishing the third-party doctrine.  
In United States v. Miller,130 a criminal defendant challenged the use of 
a subpoena to compel the production of checks, deposit slips, and other 
records held by his bank.131 Relying on Katz, Miller characterized the 
information obtained from his bank as “copies of personal records that were 
made available to the banks for a limited purpose . . . in which he ha[d] a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”132 As such, Miller argued, enforcement 
officials were required to secure a warrant before seizing the records, rather 
than a mere subpoena. But the Court, relying on the public exposure rule 
enunciated by the Katz majority133—that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection”134—found no legitimate expectation of privacy in “information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.”135 Drawing on principles from the informant 
cases, the Court held that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government,” even where the information is disclosed for a limited 
purpose.136 It made no difference that the information was gathered and held 
by a private institution, rather than an undercover agent or informant.  
It was a shocking result that seemingly defied prevailing privacy 
expectations regarding the provision of sensitive financial information to a 
trusted professional or institution. Congress responded by passing the Right 
130 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
131 Id. at 436. 
132 Id. at 442. 
133 Id. 
134 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
135 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
136 Id. at 443. 
1570 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1549 
to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), which provided protections similar to 
those that would be required if the Fourth Amendment applied.137 
Nevertheless, the constitutional relevance of the third-party doctrine as a 
manifestation of the public/private distinction remained undisturbed. 
Almost immediately, the third-party doctrine faced a technological 
challenge to its animating principle. Earlier cases had reasoned that 
individuals who voluntarily disclose information to another human being 
do not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, 
because the recipient may choose to reveal it to the government. But what 
happens when you remove the human from the system? In the telephone 
industry, for instance, human operators were being replaced by automated 
switching equipment.138 The data captured by that system was therefore 
highly unlikely to ever be observed by a living person with the capacity to 
assess the information, and to choose whether to convey it to the 
government. With no human involved in the process, there would seem to 
be little appreciable risk of disclosure139—unless, of course, enforcement 
officers were to compel the owner of an automated system to gather the 
relevant information and provide it to authorities.140 The Court considered 
these issues in the second of these principal third-party doctrine cases. 
In Smith v. Maryland,141 the defendant claimed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home phone,142 a 
record of which had been collected by a pen register installed on the 
telephone company’s automated switching system.143 In rejecting this 
assertion, the Court adopted an even more expansive statement of the third-
party doctrine that omits any reference to exposure, disclosure, or actual 
observation, instead focusing on conveyance and possession, holding that “a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
 137 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2018); see Presley v. United States, 895 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2018); Dean 
Galaro, A Reconsideration of Financial Privacy and United States v. Miller, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 31, 42 
(2017); W. Faith McElroy, Closing the Financial Privacy Loophole: Defining “Access” in the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2017). 
 138 See generally Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 
586 (2011). 
139 Id. at 585. 
140 Id. at 589–96 (discussing governmental processes for accessing third-party data). 
141 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
142 See id. at 742. 
143 See id. at 741, 744–45. 
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”144 Applying that standard to the 
automated dialing system, the Court concluded:  
[P]etitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here.
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed”
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.145
The Court thereby extends the exposure rationale of the third-party 
doctrine to the exchange of intangible information with an automated third-
party processing system.146 Human observation is irrelevant.147 It is generally 
enough that the information is conveyed, captured, and stored in the 
ordinary course of business, and is therefore available for possible 
examination148—even if only at the direction of authorities. 
Although application of the third-party doctrine to an automated 
system may strain the limits of the assumption-of-risk rationale, it is entirely 
consistent with a rigid public/private distinction that demands effective 
concealment and absolute silence. First, the Court has rejected as insufficient 
efforts to seclude information by retreating within legal and physical 
barriers.149 As such, the contractual guarantees and data-security measures 
offered by a third-party service provider do not create a legitimate privacy 
interest. Second, the Court has held that a legitimate privacy interest 
generally requires information to be physically concealed within one of a 
limited number of constitutionally protected areas, such as a dwelling 
house.150 And it would be difficult to argue that information exchanged with 
an external automated processing system owned and operated by a third-
party service provider remains effectively concealed within a protected area. 
Third, in the absence of effective concealment, the Court has treated 
information as though it were exposed in plain view of the public and 
144 Id. at 743–44. 
145 Id. at 744. 
146 See id. at 744–45. 
147 See id. at 745. 
148 See id. at 744. 
149 See infra Part II. 
150 See supra Section I.B.1. 
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government officials—no matter how unlikely their presence.151 Thus, a 
legitimate privacy interest is not preserved because droplets of individual 
information is obscured in an ocean of data or because the potential for 
human observation of the data processed by an automated system is almost 
nonexistent. It is enough that the data is potentially within reach. Fourth, 
even where information remains within a protected area and out of plain 
view, the Court has consistently held that voluntary disclosure to a trusted 
third party vitiates any legitimate privacy interest.152 Hence, even if the Court 
were to recognize automated processing as a secure system in which data is 
effectively concealed, the conveyance of personal information to a third-
party with the ability to access that data—even if such access is contractually 
disclaimed—is treated as a disclosure.  
The third-party doctrine is thus constructed upon a legal and factual 
artifice. The user of an automated processing system is said to assume the 
risk that the operator of that system will ignore all practical realities and legal 
obligations by targeting, gathering, and choosing to share specific 
information with government officials. In reality, however, this information 
remains practically obscured in automated systems awash in data. Human 
observation generally occurs only in the process of compliance with a 
request, subpoena, or court order compelling production. 
It is not terribly difficult to imagine how application of the 
public/private third-party doctrine to automated systems impacts privacy 
protections in an age of ubiquitous digital networks, third-party Internet 
service providers and intermediaries, and cloud-based computing services—
all driven by the enormous amounts of data that is provided, created, used, 
processed, stored, and transferred “in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”153 Many of the computing resources previously operated and 
maintained by the user are now outsourced to third-party providers,154 with 
data distributed across a vast network of privately-owned computing 
systems. By disclosing personal information to these automated systems and 
services, you abandon any legitimate expectation of privacy and assume the 
risk that it will be shared with the government without a warrant. It makes 
no difference that your service provider does not access your information 
151 See supra Section I.B.1. 
152 See supra Section I.B.2. 
153 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
154 See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 985, 986 (2016); supra note 138, at 585.
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and promises not to do so. Likewise, privacy guarantees made in your terms 
of service cannot create a legitimate privacy interest or defeat a subpoena for 
compelled production.  
As Judge Beverly Martin recently observed, 
blunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to allow the 
government access to a staggering amount of information . . . . [B]y 
allowing a third-party company access to our e-mail accounts, the 
websites we visit, and our search-engine history—all for legitimate 
business purposes—we give up any privacy interest in that 
information . . . . I am convinced that most [I]nternet users would 
be shocked by this.155
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch has lately expressed similar 
concerns. 
The problem isn’t with the [lower court’s] application of Smith and 
Miller but with the cases themselves. Can the government demand 
a copy of all your e-mails from Google or Microsoft without 
implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure your 
DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith 
and Miller say yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz. 
But that result strikes most lawyers and judges today—me 
included—as pretty unlikely.156 
There is a growing sense that a majority of the Court agrees. In a series 
of recent cases, the Court has begun to crack open the rigid application of 
the public/private distinction—including the third-party doctrine. I explore 
these developments in the next Part.  
II. SUBVERTING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The Court has consistently affirmed that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when three basic elements are satisfied: (a) an impermissible 
government intrusion (b) upon a legitimate privacy interest (c) in order to 
obtain information.157 Following Katz, however, application of that standard 
155 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535–36 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
156 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
157 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961)). 
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essentially collapsed into a single inquiry operationalizing the public/private 
distinction—whether the information sought by the government remained 
physically concealed within one of a limited number of constitutionally 
protected areas, neither exposed to plain view nor disclosed to a third party. 
In this Part, I discuss three recent Supreme Court cases with the potential to 
fundamentally reshape this inquiry: United States v. Jones (2012),158 Riley v. 
California (2014),159 and Carpenter v. United States (2018).160 Taken 
together, these decisions threaten to subvert the dominant role of the 
public/private distinction and the need for effective concealment as a means 
of preserving one’s legitimate privacy interest in personal information, with 
significant implications for the third-party doctrine.  
Jones signaled the Court’s initial willingness to depart from this rigid 
approach, holding that the government violates the Fourth Amendment 
when it trespasses upon an enumerated area (i.e., “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects”) for the purpose of gathering information—even if the 
information itself had been exposed to the public or disclosed to a third 
party.161 In Riley, the Court recognized that the immense amounts of 
personal information generated by and accessible through modern 
technologies might require it to reconsider the balancing of interests 
captured in certain categorical, bright-line rules of search and seizure law.162 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that information may 
itself constitute a distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection in which 
the individual maintains a legitimate privacy interest, independent of the 
space or thing in which it is held.163 Thus, the fact that some of the personal 
information accessible through Riley’s cell phone was stored on a third-
party cloud server did not eliminate the individual’s privacy interest in that 
information.164 In Carpenter, the Court drew on many of these same 
principles to fashion a limitation on the third-party doctrine—effectively 
transforming a categorical application of the public/private distinction into 
a sort of balancing test in which the act of disclosure is measured against the 
158 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
159 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
160 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
161 See infra Section II.A. 
162 See infra Section II.B. 
163 See infra Section II.B. 
164 See infra Section II.B. 
2020] A THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1575 
nature of the data sought.165 This transformation required two key changes 
in the doctrine. The Court held: first, that the disclosure or conveyance of 
personal information to a third party significantly diminishes, rather than 
eliminates, the individual’s legitimate privacy interest;166 and second, that 
certain information is so revealing and sensitive that the degree of intrusion 
arising from a governmental search will outweigh the diminishing effects of 
that disclosure or conveyance.167 This progressive subversion of the 
public/private distinction is discussed in the Sections that follow. 
A. United States v. Jones
In Jones, police attached a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking 
device to the undercarriage of a suspect’s car and used that device to 
continuously monitor the vehicle’s physical location and movements over a 
twenty-eight day period.168 Prior to trial, Jones sought to suppress the 
evidence obtained, arguing that the government’s actions constituted a 
warrantless search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.169 The 
government countered that, under Katz and its progeny, Jones had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in either the outer surface of the vehicle or 
its movements along public streets, as these areas and information were 
exposed to the public.170 Thus, no search had occurred when police obtained 
information that was otherwise in plain view of the public and no warrant 
was required. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court not only rejected the 
government’s argument but found Katz to be altogether inapplicable in 
resolving the question.171 Justice Scalia began his analysis with a basic 
proposition: that the Court was constitutionally bound to “assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”172 And “for most of our history the 
165 See infra Section II.C. 
166 See infra Section II.C. 
167 See infra Section II.C. 
168 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012). 
169 Id. at 403. 
170 Id. at 406. 
171 Id. at 406–07. 
172 Id. at 406 (citations omitted). 
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Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for 
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) 
it enumerates.”173 Katz should not therefore be read as eliminating or 
replacing these traditional protections, but instead as providing additional 
and more expansive safeguards.174  
In defining the essential substance of these privacy protections, the 
Court reaffirmed that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, where . . . the Government [1] obtains 
information [2] by physically intruding [3] on a constitutionally protected 
area.”175 Thus, a minimalist version of the “common-law trespassory test” 
had survived the transition from Olmstead to Katz, safeguarding those areas 
specifically enumerated in the Fourth Amendment from impermissible 
physical intrusion. Applying this standard to Jones, Scalia concluded that 
monitoring a vehicle’s location (obtaining information) by attaching the 
GPS tracking device (physical intrusion/trespass) to the suspect’s vehicle (a 
constitutionally protected “effect”), constitutes an invalid warrantless 
search.176 
Having restored these traditional minimum safeguards as a distinct 
theory of Fourth Amendment protection, the Jones Court was then left to 
address the public nature of the locational information gathered by the GPS 
device. The Court had previously held that “[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another,” because that 
information is “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”177 This 
reasoning is consistent with the basic premise of the public/private 
distinction, as applied through Katz, which treats the failure to conceal 
information as if it were exposed in plain view. Relying on these earlier cases, 
the government implicitly argued in Jones that a search producing only 
public information cannot violate the Fourth Amendment. But Scalia 
rejected that premise. 
173 Id. at 406–07 (citations omitted). 
174 Id. at 407–08, 409. 
175 Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 407 
(majority opinion). 
 176 Id. at 404. 
 177 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
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In these earlier cases, the suspects’ location information had been 
gathered without trespassing upon an enumerated area.178 The Court had 
therefore applied the Katz standard, as developed through the public 
exposure cases, finding the suspects’ privacy claims to be limited by the 
failure to conceal their location from public view.179 In Jones, on the other 
hand, the government did commit trespass, both in the process of attaching 
the GPS device and when changing its battery.180 Under these circumstances, 
the violation accrues at the moment of physical intrusion upon an 
enumerated area for the purpose of gathering information. The public 
nature of the information eventually gathered—in the sense that the 
suspects’ location was exposed in plain view of the public—is therefore 
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the privacy interest infringed by the prior act 
of trespass.  
Justice Alito, although concurring in the judgment, nevertheless 
criticized Scalia for returning to the now-discredited Olmstead rule that “a 
technical trespass followed by the gathering of evidence constitutes a 
search.”181 But this seems a mischaracterization of the decision. Scalia did 
not suggest that any trespass upon any private property is a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, he created a more narrow 
exception to the public/private distinction for physical trespass upon certain 
enumerated areas—”persons, houses, papers, and effects”182 —allowing that 
in such cases individuals may retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information that has been exposed to the public or disclosed to a third party. 
The Jones decision opened a crack in the public/private distinction by 
resurrecting the trespass doctrine as “Step Zero”183 in the Fourth 
Amendment analysis and applying that doctrine beyond the special 
solicitude of the home. This Step Zero focuses on how police obtained the 
 178 Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–09 (discussing the beeper cases, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, and United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)). 
179 Id. at 408–09 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82). 
180  Id. at 403–04. 
181 Id. at 421 (Alito, J., concurring). 
182 Id. at 405 (majority opinion) (holding that the Fourth Amendment cannot be read to interpret 
the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” as “superfluous”); id. at 406 (noting that “for 
most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for 
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates”); id. at 404 
(finding Jones’s vehicle to be an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 183 The “Step Zero” formulation describes the initial inquiry into whether the governing legal 
framework—here, Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy standard”—applies at all. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (discussing the most famous “Step Zero”). 
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relevant information, i.e., whether it was obtained by trespass upon an 
enumerated area. If so, the trespass itself constitutes an intrusion upon the 
individual’s legitimate privacy interests. At that point, the public/private 
distinction drops out of the picture. The unconstitutional intrusion is not 
excused simply because the individual has no independent privacy interest 
in the information collected, either because the information was in plain 
view of the public or disclosed to a third party.  
B. Riley v. California
In Riley, the Court addressed protections for personal information 
available on an individual’s cell phone, whether that information resides 
locally on the phone itself184 or on remote servers accessible through the use 
of phone-based applications.185 Officers conducting a routine search 
incident to arrest found a cell phone in Riley’s pants pocket.186 An officer on 
the scene “accessed information on the phone” that he believed indicated 
Riley’s involvement with a gang.187 Following Riley’s transfer to the station 
house, a detective “further examined the contents of the phone . . . looking 
for evidence.”188 Certain pictures and videos found in the course of that 
search provided key investigative information, with several being described 
and/or submitted at trial.189 Riley challenged the warrantless search of the 
content of his cell phone as unreasonable.190 The government, relying on 
United States v. Robinson,191 responded that no warrant was required 
because the search fell within a specific exception to the warrant 
requirement192—permitting officers to examine the content of objects found 
in the course of a search incident to a custodial arrest.193 
184 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014). 
185 Id. at 397. 
186 Id. at 378–79. 
187 Id. at 379. 
188 Id. (citation omitted). 
189 Id. at 379–80. 
190 Id. at 379. 
191 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
192 Riley, 573 U.S. at 383–84. 
193 Id. at 382–85 (describing the search-incident-to-arrest exception). 
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Acknowledging Robinson as a “categorical rule,”194 the Supreme Court 
nevertheless rejected its application to a search of data stored on and 
accessible by a cell phone.195 The Court first held that in determining 
whether an exception to the warrant requirement is reasonable, it must 
balance the legitimate governmental interests served by the warrantless 
search against the intrusion upon an individual’s personal privacy.196 
Applying this standard, the Court made a clear distinction between the 
device (cell phone) and the data (content). The Court found that the risks 
justifying the Robinson rule—harm to officers and destruction of evidence—
although manifest in physical objects, are de minimis “when the search is of 
digital data.”197 Moreover, the degree of intrusion effected by a search of cell 
phone data, measured by the quantity and nature of the personal 
information revealed, “bears little resemblance” to a search of other physical 
objects.198 The Court therefore “decline[d] to extend Robinson to searches of 
data on cell phones . . . hold[ing] instead that officers must generally secure 
a warrant before conducting such a search.”199 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was careful to recognize that the 
functional relationship between the physical device and the digital data—i.e., 
that the device collects, uses, stores, shares, and provides access to data—
should not obscure the distinct and independent significance of personal 
information in a Fourth Amendment analysis. Individuals may have a 
legitimate and significant interest in that information qua information. 
Certainly, cell phones are different from other “containers” discovered in the 
course of a search incident to arrest. They are “minicomputers” with 
“immense storage capacity,”200 running multiple software programs 
(applications) that handle constant flows of varied and detailed 
information.201 But it is the information itself that creates significant Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
194 Id. at 386. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 385–86. 
197 Id. at 386. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 393. 
201 Id. at 394–97. 
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The Court first draws this distinction between device and data in the 
context of the personal information residing in local storage—i.e., in the 
phone’s memory.202 As the Court observes, collecting vast quantities of “even 
just one type of information . . . convey[s] far more than previously 
possible.”203 And access to “many distinct types of information . . . reveal[s] 
much more in combination than any isolated record.”204 Moreover, that data 
is often retrospective, stretching back over long periods of time.205 And it is 
this “revealing montage of the user’s life,”206 not the physical characteristics 
of the object itself, that distinguishes the search of a cell phone from the 
search of “a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”207  
The analytical distinction between the device and the data is fully 
realized, however, in the context of cloud computing. Many cell phones and 
software applications seamlessly integrate cloud computing services, 
allowing users to access “data stored on remote servers rather than on the 
device itself.”208 “Cell phone users often may not know whether particular 
information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes 
little difference. Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally on 
the device for one user and in the cloud for another.”209 This creates a 
particular challenge for the search incident to arrest exception, which is 
limited to “papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee.”210 
Applying that limit in Riley, the Court distinguishes between the cell phone, 
as a physical object located within the physical proximity of an arrestee, and 
the data located in remote storage outside the physical proximity of an 
arrestee.211 The physical aspects of the phone may be examined,212 for 
202 Id. at 393–97. 
203 Id. at 394. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 394–96. 
206 Id. at 396. 
207 Id. at 393. 
208 Id. at 397. 
209 Id. (citation omitted). 
210 Id. at 398. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 387; see also People v. Ward, 169 A.D.3d 833, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (finding that “a 
physical search of the phone, in which the police opened the back of the phone and looked under the 
battery to obtain the phone’s serial number . . . did not implicate any of the aspects found to distinguish 
a digital search from a search of any other physical object”). 
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example, to ensure that it cannot be used as a weapon.213 But the exception 
“may not be stretched to cover a search of files accessed remotely—that is, a 
search of files stored in the cloud.”214  
This discussion of cloud-based data is particularly relevant to Riley’s 
significance as a subversion of the public/private distinction. Having 
acknowledged the unique nature of the personal information available on a 
cell phone, the Court rejected rote application of an existing categorical rule 
that would have permitted police to search the contents of a cell phone seized 
incident to arrest. Instead, the Court chose to revisit the balancing of 
interests intended to be captured by that categorical rule. The public’s 
interest in protecting officers and evidence was weighed against the 
intrusion visited upon the individual’s legitimate privacy interests. Had the 
Court rigidly applied the third-party doctrine to the cloud-based data 
accessible through Riley’s cell phone, any legitimate privacy interest in that 
data would have been eliminated from this analysis. Instead, the Court 
found it noteworthy that police would have access to this data—stored 
remotely, outside the physical proximity of an arrestee. Thus, one categorical 
rule was exchanged for another, requiring a warrant prior to searching the 
content of a cell phone seized incident to arrest. 
C. Carpenter v. United States
In Carpenter, the Court examined protections for metadata created by 
the automated processes associated with the use of a cell phone; specifically, 
cell-site location data (CSLI).215 Officers suspected that Carpenter was 
involved in a series of nine robberies occurring over a four-month period.216 
Seeking to establish that Carpenter was in the vicinity at the time of each 
robbery, prosecutors obtained a statutory court order issued pursuant to the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA),217 compelling Carpenter’s wireless 
213 Riley, 573 U.S. at 387. 
214 Id. at 397 (citation omitted). 
215 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (stating the question presented as 
“whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical 
cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements”); see also id. 
at 2211–12 (describing CSLI and how it is generated). 
216 Id. at 2212. 
217 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018). 
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carriers to turn over four months of CSLI for his cellular telephone.218 
“Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging 
Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”219 
Carpenter sought to suppress these records at trial,220 arguing that the 
information sought by law enforcement was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment and that the government was therefore required to obtain a 
judicial warrant rather than a court order issued pursuant to the SCA.221 The 
district court denied the motion222 and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that Carpenter had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
his location information because he had voluntarily shared it with his 
wireless carriers.223 
This conclusion reflects the rigidity of the public exposure and third-
party disclosure cases. Applying the public-exposure doctrine, Carpenter’s 
physical proximity to the robberies had been “voluntarily conveyed to 
anyone who wanted to look,”224 and information that “a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”225 Having failed to effectively conceal himself within a protected 
area, all of Carpenter’s location information would be treated as though it 
were continuously exposed in plain view, observed, tracked, and recorded. 
Likewise, even if one might claim a privacy interest in public location 
information more generally, that claim is extinguished by the voluntary act 
of disclosure or conveyance to a third party226—here, Carpenter’s wireless 
provider.227 As explained in Miller and Smith, the third-party doctrine does 
not “distinguish between kinds of information disclosed to third parties and 
require courts to decide whether to ‘extend’ [the third-party doctrine] to 
particular classes of information, depending on their sensitivity.”228 Thus, 
the intensely personal and revealing nature of CSLI would be largely 
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
218 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12. 




223 Id. at 2213. 
224 Id. at 2215 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
225 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (citations omitted). 
226 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
227 Id. at 2212, 2220. 
228 Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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On review, however, the Supreme Court rejected this binary 
conception of privacy, marking a significant shift in application of the 
public/private distinction. Adopting a more flexible analysis, the Court 
transformed this bright-line rule into a balancing test, measuring the act of 
exposure and/or disclosure against both the manner of surveillance and the 
nature of the information sought. After Carpenter, exposure and/or 
disclosure of personal information to a third party does not eliminate the 
individual’s legitimate privacy interest in that information—as was the case 
under the categorical approach—but is instead treated as merely 
diminishing the individual’s expectation of privacy. In some cases, the 
surveillance will be so permeating and the information so sensitive that the 
individual’s privacy interest and resulting degree of intrusion will outweigh 
the diminishing effects of exposure and/or disclosure, triggering the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement. 
Applying this new balancing test, the Court focused its analysis on the 
“unique”229 and “deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its 
collection.”230 Unlike the limited locational data that could be gathered using 
traditional law enforcement methods,231 CSLI is an exhaustive and “detailed 
chronical of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, 
over several years.”232 Thus, the privacy implications of each locational data 
point cannot be viewed in isolation, but as an aggregated whole that 
“provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his 
particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations’”233—what the Court describes as the 
“privacies of life.”234 Measuring this unremitting collection of sensitive data 
against the act of disclosure, the Court observes that the information “is not 
truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” but is rather 
automatically produced merely through the use of a device (cellphone) 
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”235 The diminishing effect 
229 Id. at 2217, 2220 (majority opinion). 
230 Id. at 2223. 
231 Id. at 2217. 
232 Id. at 2220. 
233 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
234 Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)). 
235 Id. at 2220. 
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of disclosure is therefore insufficient to outweigh Carpenter’s legitimate 
privacy interest. 
III. A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this Part, I propose a framework for analyzing a user’s Fourth 
Amendment interests in the metadata generated by automated devices and 
systems; specifically, where that metadata is accessed, collected, and stored 
by third-party providers. Taken together, Jones, Riley, and Carpenter 
transform the third-party doctrine from a broad, technology-neutral 
standard into a differentiated and potentially technology-dependent 
balancing test. Carpenter provides one specific example, holding that law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to obtaining seven or more days of 
historical CSLI metadata.236 What these cases fail to provide, however, is a 
clear and thorough accounting of how this new approach can and should be 
applied to other metadata-intensive technologies. My proposed framework 
fills this gap, working within the basic structure of the Carpenter balancing 
test but identifying a series of factors and subfactors to be considered in 
evaluating each element. The result is a consistent, comprehensive, and 
generalized approach to the creation of technology-specific standards that 
effectuate the Court’s strong preference for workable, bright-line rules in 
implementing the warrant requirement. 
My proposal proceeds in four parts. First, I establish the basic structure 
of the Carpenter balancing test, as an adaption of the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” analysis. Second, I describe the fundamental concerns and 
constitutional principles guiding development of the proposed framework. 
Third, I set forth the entirety of the proposed framework, identifying and 
categorizing the various factors to be considered in constructing a workable 
approach to the development of categorical rules for metadata generated by 
automated systems. Fourth, I explore multiple examples of how this 
framework might be applied to other technologies and metadata sets.  
236 Id. at 2217. 
2020] A THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1585 
A. The Carpenter Balancing Test
Carpenter recognizes that new automated technologies require the 
Court to reassess the balancing of interests captured by the third-party 
doctrine. Although the public/private distinction remains a factor in the 
“reasonableness” analysis, it is not always determinative. Application of the 
third-party doctrine must reflect and be limited by “the basic purpose” of the 
Fourth Amendment: “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasion by government officials.”237 In effectuating this 
fundamental purpose, the Court is “informed by historical understandings 
‘of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth 
Amendment] was adopted,’”238 including general warrants authorizing “an 
unrestrained search”239 of nearly anyone, at any time, with little suspicion or 
none at all.240 Thus, the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard must 
be applied so as to “secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”241 
Guided by these basic principles, Carpenter measures the act of 
disclosure against the nature of the information sought. This balancing 
approach involves a three-step analysis. Step one determines the strength 
and legitimacy of an individual’s privacy interest in the information sought 
by the government. Step two considers the extent to which disclosure or 
conveyance of personal information to a third party diminishes an 
individual’s legitimate privacy interest in that information. Step three 
balances the individual privacy interest against the diminishing effect of 
third-party disclosure. In some cases, the information will be so sensitive 
and so revealing that the degree of intrusion arising from a governmental 
search will outweigh the diminishing effects of disclosure. In such cases, a 
warrant is generally required. 
237 Id. at 2213 (citation omitted). 
238 Id. at 2214 (punctuation omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). 
239  Id. at 2213. 
240 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2016). 
241 Carpenter, 138 U.S. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
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B. Guiding Principles
In constructing the proposed framework, I am guided by an 
overarching concern about the government’s ability to derive sensitive 
personal information from seemingly innocuous metadata, and its 
implications for basic Fourth Amendment principles. An individual’s 
legitimate privacy interest should effectuate constitutional restraints upon 
“a too permeating police surveillance”242—surveillance that “spread[s] 
through” an individual’s life and is “present in every part of it.”243 This 
concern reflects the reality of modern technologies. The devices themselves 
are pervasive and persistent. So is the mechanism for producing, collecting, 
and sharing data. This process is so “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient”244 
that the need for time, money, and resources provides little constraint. 
Nearly all of this data is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly 
compiled,”245 where it essentially remains in permanent storage. It is an 
unremitting process so embedded in the fabric of our daily lives that “[o]nly 
the few [can] escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”246 
The vast stores of metadata produced by this unrelenting surveillance 
are often “deeply revealing” in their breadth and comprehensive reach,247 
providing “an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing . . . ‘familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’”248— what Chief 
Justice Roberts describes as “the privacies of life.”249 Providing the 
government with access to all of this privately held data would risk “arbitrary 
invasions” reminiscent of the “reviled general warrants and writs of 
assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage 
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal 
242 Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 243 Permeate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
permeate [https://perma.cc/P2DM-DU82] (defining “permeate” as “to spread through something and 
be present in every part of it”); see also Permeate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/permeate [https://perma.cc/SDW6-S6A2] (defining “permeate” as “to diffuse 
through or penetrate something”). 
244 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18. 
245 Id. at 2216. 
246 Id. at 2218. 
247 Id. at 2223. 
248 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring)). 
249 Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
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activity.”250 Understanding that a search of this metadata will often expose 
“private aspects of identity,”251 the absence of adequate safeguards “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”252 The question is not precisely how 
much or how many types of data are provided, but what that data can tell 
you. 
It was these basic concerns about persistent and indiscriminate 
surveillance, access to immense databases, and the arbitrary exercise of 
government power that led the Riley Court to exempt cellphones from the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception, citing the degree of intrusion resulting 
from an unrestrained search of the device. The Court was troubled not only 
by the amount and variety of data accessible through a cellphone but also the 
retrospective nature of the data, enabling the government to reconstruct a 
“revealing montage of the user’s life.”253 Likewise, in Jones and Carpenter, the 
Court held that “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
whole of their physical movements,”254 because society does not “reasonably 
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner 
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”255 As in Riley, CSLI 
surveillance runs against everyone all the time, creating a comprehensive 
dossier from which sensitive information can be derived and which 
therefore “implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary 
government power.”256 
 250 Id. at 2213 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 
(2014) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 251 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 
(analogizing the nature of the information derived from the GPS data at issue in Jones to the CSLI 
records at issue in Carpenter). 
252 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 253 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396; id. at 403 (finding that cell phones “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies 
of life’”). 
254 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
255 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also id. at 415 (expressing concern that “a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements . . . reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”). 
256 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 
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C. Proposed Framework
The proposed framework fills significant analytical gaps left open by 
Jones, Riley, and Carpenter—identifying a series of factors and subfactors to 
be considered in evaluating each element of the new balancing test. My goal 
is to provide lower courts with a consistent, comprehensive, and generalized 
approach to the creation of technology-specific standards that effectuate the 
Court’s strong preference for workable, bright-line rules. 
Step (1): Defining the Privacy Interest 
In determining the legitimacy and strength of the privacy interest in 
particular metadata, two factors are considered: (a) the nature of the 
metadata generated and collected, and (b) the ability to derive personal 
information from aggregated metadata. 
(a) Factor: Nature of the Metadata Generated and Collected. Courts
should consider the following: (i) government access to
comprehensive dossiers of historical metadata and (ii)
undifferentiated collection and long-term storage of metadata.
i. Subfactor: Comprehensive Dossiers of Historical Metadata.
Metadata-intensive technologies—such as Internet
browsers, cellphones, and smart-home appliances—are
now a pervasive part of modern society. These automated
technologies are continually generating, collecting, and
storing vast amounts of metadata. Unlike the information
that could be gathered using traditional law enforcement
methods, these exhaustive stores of metadata are
“compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”257
A court should consider that the very existence of a
comprehensive dossier of sensitive metadata constitutes
the type of inescapable surveillance that creates a
significant risk of arbitrary government invasion.
ii. Subfactor: Undifferentiated Collection and Long-Term
Storage of Metadata. This pervasive surveillance runs
against nearly everyone, all the time, so police need not
know who they want to follow in advance. In the case of
257 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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CSLI metadata, for instance, the government “can now 
travel back in time [and] . . . whoever the suspect turns out 
to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every 
day for five years.”258 A court should therefore consider 
whether the metadata sought by the government is so 
broadly collected and stored that a retroactive search, even 
where individualized, exceeds society’s expectations. 
(b) Factor: Ability to Derive Personal Information from Aggregated
Metadata. This factor is primarily concerned with the degree to
which the metadata sought by the government is likely to reveal the 
privacies of life, generally defined by reference to eight categories
of sensitive information.259
1. Finances—e.g., budgeting, commercial transactions.260
2. Legal matters—e.g., meeting with a criminal defense
attorney.261
3. Physical and mental health—e.g., meeting with a
psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion clinic, or AIDS
treatment center;262 treatment for an alcohol, drug, or
gambling addition;263 tracking pregnancy symptoms;264
web searches related to a certain disease or condition.265
4. Sexual orientation, associations, and activities266—e.g.,
trips to a strip club, by-the-hour motel, or gay bar;267 dating
applications.268
5. Familial associations269—e.g., trips to a private residence.270
258 Id. at 2218. 
259 See supra Section II.C. 
260 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014). 
261 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009) (cited with approval in United States 
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring)). 
262 Id.
263 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 395–96.
266 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415, 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
267 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199–200. 
268 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396. 
269 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415. 
270 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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6. Professional associations271—e.g., union meetings.272
7. Political beliefs, affiliations, and activities273—e.g.,
following political party news,274 trips to political
headquarters.275
8. Religious beliefs and affiliations276—e.g., trips to a mosque,
synagogue, or church;277 sharing prayer requests.278
Assessing the government’s ability to derive this type of sensitive 
information from aggregated metadata requires a two-part inquiry, 
examining both the possibility and probability that the category of data 
sought by the government will reveal sensitive information. 
i. Subfactor: The Possibility of a Reliable Linkage. Possibility
requires simply that a court find it abstractly possible that
there is some reliable linkage between the metadata
generated and personal information that might be derived
from its collection. Here, the Court has not indicated that
attenuation is a concern, but only that a direct linkage is
possible. CSLI records provide a good example. Generally
speaking, the data provided to law enforcement consists of
cell-site registration data, indicating the cell-site to which
a particular phone was connected at a particular time. Law
enforcement also has access to a list of cell-site locations,
indicating where each cell site is located (longitude and
latitude) and the geographical sector served by each of the
various antennas located on that cell site. By mapping the
cell-site registration data onto the list of cell-site locations,
law enforcement is able to derive a fairly accurate
approximation of where a user’s cell phone was located at
various times of the day, as well as their movements. It is
this geographical location data “that enables the
271 Id. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415. 
272 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199–200 (cited with approval in Jones, 565 U.S. at 415). 
273 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16. 
274 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396 (discussing “apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news”). 
275 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
276 Id. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16. 
277 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199–200. 
278 Riley, 273 U.S. at 396. 
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Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”279 
ii. Subfactor: The Probability of a Reliable Linkage. The
probability analysis considers two aspects of the metadata
sought to determine whether and under what
circumstances a particular category of data is likely to
reveal sensitive information: precision and/or detail and
amount and/or density.
• Precision and/or Detail. First, a court should
examine the level of data precision and detail;
including, in some cases, whether the data is time-
stamped.280 For instance, in Jones, Justice
Sotomayor found that GPS systems using multiple 
satellites had the ability to “establish[] the vehicle’s
location within 50 to 100 feet.”281 The Court
reached a similar result in Carpenter, even though
the accuracy of CSLI was less than that of GPS
data.282
• Amount and/or Density. Second, a court should
consider the amount and/or density of data within
that category. This is perhaps the most difficult
aspect of the analysis. It is clear, however, that the
longer the period of time and the more data points
collected (i.e., sustained density), the more likely it
is that the data will reveal sensitive information.
But it is equally apparent that the amount and/or
density of data required may vary based on the
precision and detail of that data. In Carpenter, for
example, the Court found that obtaining 127 days
of location tracking data with an average of 101
data points per day was sufficient to establish the
government’s ability to ascertain sensitive
279 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 280 The Court also appears to require in all cases that the data be recorded and aggregated by the 
service provider. Id. 
281 Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
282 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
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information, even where the accuracy of CSLI was 
less than that of GPS data.283 Justice Sotomayor 
posited, however, that “even short-term 
monitoring” that produces a “precise, 
comprehensive record” may be sufficiently likely 
to reveal sensitive information.284 This conclusion 
is supported by Carpenter, which held that a 
warrant was required for each of two distinct CSLI 
record requests—one covering 152 days from 
MetroPCS, the other just seven days from Sprint 
(which ultimately produced only two days of 
records).285 
Step (2): Diminishing Effects of Disclosure 
The third-party doctrine holds that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”286 Framed through the lens of the public/private distinction, this 
analysis remained primarily focused on the individual’s ability to proactively 
conceal information.287 In the absence of active and effective concealment it 
was assumed that information had been voluntarily disclosed.288 In the 
context of automated systems, the choice to utilize a particular service or 
device was itself a failure to conceal all associated data, which is therefore 
said to have been voluntarily disclosed to the provider.  
In Carpenter, the Court concludes that this categorical rule cannot be 
mechanically extended to automated, data-intensive technologies. In some 
cases, disclosure diminishes an individual’s privacy interest in information 
but does not eliminate it. Not all acts of “voluntary exposure” impose the 
same degree of diminution.289 In determining the degree of diminution, the 
283 Id. at 2212. 
284 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415. 
285 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13. 
286 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
287 See discussion supra Section I.D. 
288 See discussion supra Section I.D. 
289 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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Court focuses on the voluntariness of that disclosure to determine whether 
the data was “truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”290  
Drawing from Carpenter and Riley, I identify two key factors in 
assessing the degree to which metadata is truly and voluntarily shared with 
the third-party provider: (a) the extent to which the device or service 
generating the metadata is a necessity to participation in a modern society, 
and (b) the user’s practical ability to control the automated generation and 
conveyance of metadata to a third party during the use of that device or 
service.  
(a) Factor: Necessity of the Device or Service to Participation in a
Modern Society. The necessity analysis acknowledges that certain
data-intensive devices and services are now essentially
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”291 Here, a court 
should consider the role of the device or service in society—both
personal and professional—as well as structural adaptions that
increasingly require always-on connectivity. Studies indicate, for
instance, that ninety percent of Americans use the Internet292 and
ninety-six percent own a cellphone (eighty-one percent of which
are smartphones).293 It is worth noting that these pervasive and
persistent devices are more likely to be present in private places and
situations, producing, collecting, and sharing immense amounts of
data from which sensitive information is likely to be derived.294
Cellphones, for instance, are “such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life”295 that people “compulsively carry” them at all times”296—
“beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s
offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband [https://perma.cc/QGS7-
MKTR]. 
 293 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/H6SM-7U33]. 
294 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
295 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
296 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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locales.”297 Almost like a feature of human anatomy,298 “nearly 
three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of 
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even 
use their phones in the shower.”299 
(b) Factor: Ability to Control Automated Metadata Generation and
Collection. In assessing the user’s ability to control the conveyance
of metadata to a third party during the use of that device or service,
courts should consider three subfactors: first, whether the category
of data sought by the government is automatically generated,
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up;”300 second, which and what percentage of activities
carried out through the device or service generate the category of
data sought;301 and third, whether it is possible to lessen or
eliminate the conveyance of the category of data sought without
abandoning the device or service.302
Step (3): Balancing 
In the final step of the analysis, the individual’s privacy interest is 
balanced against the diminishing effect of third-party disclosure to 
determine whether she enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
metadata sought by the government. If so, and assuming no exception 
applies, access to that data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and a 
warrant is presumptively required. In making this assessment, a court 
should be guided by the basic purposes of the Fourth Amendment: 
protecting the privacies of life against arbitrary invasion and too permeating 
police surveillance. 
In the absence of additional guidance, Carpenter provides a single point 
of comparison for future cases. Carpenter holds that individuals have a 
legitimate privacy interest in the whole of their physical movements, 
primarily because access to those records is likely to reveal sensitive 
information. CSLI metadata provides a precise and detailed accounting of 
297 Id. 
298 Riley, 573 U.S. at 385. 
299 Id. at 395. 
300 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
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an individual’s location and movements, establishing a reliable linkage to the 
privacies of life. Given the sustained density of CSLI metadata collection, 
there is a high probability that government access to even a short period of 
CSLI metadata will reveal sensitive information. Moreover, this 
comprehensive metadata is collected on nearly everyone and stored for long 
periods, creating the risk of arbitrary retroactive surveillance. An individual 
therefore has a legitimate and significant privacy interest in her CSLI 
metadata. Carpenter then determines that CSLI metadata is not truly shared 
and thus that third-party disclosure does little to diminish an individual’s 
privacy interest. This reflects both the necessity of a cellphone to 
participation in modern society and the user’s inability to adequately control 
the disclosure of CSLI metadata without giving up the cellphone itself. The 
practical inability to escape this constant and revealing surveillance creates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and demands Fourth Amendment 
protection.  
D. Using the Proposed Framework to Derive Bright-Line Rules
In this Section, I explore how this proposed framework could be 
applied to other automated technologies and metadata sets.  
Real-Time CSLI. “Prospective, or real-time, CSLI permits police to 
determine the phone’s current location as it registers with each tower.”303 
Police may seek current records or ask the cellular provider to “ping” the 
cellphone to determine its current location—for instance, when searching 
for a fugitive.304 As relevant to the proposed framework, a request for real-
time CSLI differs from historical CSLI in three key ways. First, although 
cellular providers compile comprehensive dossiers of historical CSLI, a 
request for real-time CSLI does not involve a substantially retroactive search 
of that database. Second, in most cases these requests will produce far fewer 
data points over a very limited period of time.305 Third, police will often 
request that the cellular provider actively initiate collection of CSLI by 
 303 Christian Bennardo, Note, The Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic Theory, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2392 (2017). 
304 See, e.g., Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 636–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). 
305 See, e.g., id. at 646 (addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge to police access of just three hours 
of real-time CSLI records, in which the suspect’s cellular provider pinged his phone fewer than five 
times). 
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“pinging” the individual’s cellphone—as opposed to tracking the cellphone’s 
attempt to connect with the network. 
As applied in step one of the proposed framework, these distinctions 
weaken the individual’s privacy interest in particular metadata. Although 
real-time CSLI draws upon the metadata generated by persistent 
surveillance, a targeted request for a limited amount of current information 
does not implicate concerns of undifferentiated collection and retroactive 
tracking to the same degree, lessening the risk of arbitrary government 
invasion. Moreover, narrow metadata requests—limited in amount and 
density—are less likely to reveal the privacies of life sought to be secured by 
the Fourth Amendment. It is worth noting, however, that repeated and 
proximate requests for real-time CSLI will, at some point, begin to take on 
many of the same characteristics and concerns of historical CSLI. As Justice 
Sotomayor observed in Jones, “even short-term monitoring” that produces 
a “precise, comprehensive record” may be sufficiently likely to reveal 
sensitive information,306 strengthening the individual’s privacy interest.  
In step two, certain methods of acquiring real-time CSLI may diminish 
an individual’s privacy interest in that metadata to an even lesser degree than 
historical CSLI. Carpenter recognized that a cellphone user has little 
practical ability to control the conveyance of metadata to a third-party, in 
part because CSLI is automatically generated by the cellphone itself “by dint 
of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user.”307 When 
a cellular provider initiates the exchange of metadata at the government’s 
request—pinging an otherwise inactive phone—the act of disclosure is 
entirely involuntary and the third-party doctrine has minimal diminishing 
effect. 
The structured approach of the proposed framework bears fruit in the 
final step of the analysis, in which the individual’s privacy interest is 
balanced against the diminishing effects of third-party disclosure. A case 
comparison helps illustrate this point. In Sims v. State,308 police located a 
suspect by initiating the exchange of real-time CSLI metadata. The court 
concluded that Sims “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
physical movements or his location as reflected in the less than three hours 
306 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
307 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also id. (observing that “[a]part from disconnecting the phone 
from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data”). 
308 569 S.W.3d 634. 
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of real-time CSLI records accessed by police by pinging his phone less than 
five times.”309 In reaching this result, the court focused almost exclusively on 
the amount of metadata requested. 
Under the Sims approach, the search analysis does not turn on the 
content of the CSLI records but instead on whether the government 
searched or seized “enough” information that it violated a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. There is no bright-line rule for determining how long 
police must track a person’s cellphone in real time before it violates a 
person’s legitimate expectation of privacy in those records. Whether a 
person has a recognized expectation of privacy in real-time CSLI records 
must be decided on a case-by-case basis.310 
The Sims court’s approach suffers from two key deficiencies. First, it 
fails to account for both the commonalities and differences between 
historical and real-time CSLI. Second, it precludes the use of a balancing test 
for the creation of workable, bright-line rules.  
The proposed framework remedies both concerns. As described above, 
the multi-factor analysis identifies three key distinctions between real-time 
and historical CSLI—retroactivity, amount or density, and control over the 
act of disclosure—each of which potentially impacts the outcome of the 
balancing test. They also provide a principled basis for the formulation of 
bright-line rules. In the Sims case, for instance, police sought a limited 
amount of current data targeting a specific individual. The suspect’s privacy 
interest was therefore significantly weaker than that recognized in 
Carpenter. It was the police, however, that initiated the metadata exchange 
by pinging Sims’s cellphone, minimizing any diminishing effects of third-
party disclosure. Balancing these competing elements, a court might 
conclude that these distinctions are immaterial and that a warrant is 
therefore required for both historical and real-time CSLI. On the other hand, 
it might find the retroactive nature of the data request to be determinative 
and conclude that no warrant is required for real-time CSLI. Alternatively, 
it could draw a line at control over the act of disclosure, requiring police to 
obtain a warrant only before initiating a ping of the suspect’s cellphone. In 
each case, the court would be engaging in the principled development of 
workable rules that effectuate the basic purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
309 See, e.g., id. at 646. 
310 See, e.g., id. 
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IP Addresses. 
Each time a customer connects [to the Internet], the ISP [Internet 
Service Provider] assigns a unique identifier, known as an IP 
address, to the customer’s computer terminal. Depending on the 
ISP, a customer’s IP address can change each time he logs on to the 
Internet. ISPs retain . . . records of the IP addresses that they assign 
to customers [for up to ninety days].311  
In many cases, a user’s physical location can be derived from the IP address.  
An ISP’s IP address records share several common characteristics with 
CSLI. First, these records provide a comprehensive historical database of a 
user’s points of Internet access, gathered on nearly every American.312 
Second, IP addresses “convey location information with similar degrees of 
specificity” as CSLI.313 Third, Internet access is “indispensable to 
participation in modern society”314 and IP addresses are automatically 
generated and collected as part of that process. Nevertheless, most courts to 
consider the application of Carpenter to IP address records “have adopted a 
categorical approach”315 that essentially ignores these key differences; it is 
enough that IP addresses weren’t CSLI. 
Recognizing that the concerns expressed in Carpenter are implicated 
by other automated technologies, the proposed framework provides a more 
structured and principled basis for this distinction. As relevant to the 
identified factors, IP address records do not provide the amount or sustained 
density of locational metadata as CSLI, and that metadata is retained for a 
much shorter period. Hardwired and wireless broadband access is generally 
limited to certain locations, while cellular access is essentially identical to 
that of CSLI. Moreover, it can be argued that IP addresses are not 
automatically generated “without any affirmative act on the part of the user 
beyond powering up”316 but requires the user to open an Internet browser or 
other network application. Each of these discrepancies’ maps to a relevant 
311 United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010). 
312 Supra note 292. 
313 United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
314 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
315 Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 362. 
316 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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factor in the proposed framework, potentially tilting the outcome of the 
balancing test and supporting a different bright-line rule. 
Focusing exclusively on the potential for IP addresses to provide 
location information, the ultimate question remains whether this metadata 
is the type of “detailed and comprehensive record of a person’s movements” 
that is likely to reveal the privacies of life.317 A court might conclude, for 
instance, that Internet browsing will never provide the necessary amount or 
sustained density of locational data to provide that linkage. Courts may 
reach a different result, however, where the IP address is generated by 
software applications that automatically connect to the Internet even when 
not in use. Alternatively, a court might draw a line between stationary 
technologies (e.g., desktop, connected appliance) and mobile devices (e.g., 
laptop, smartphone) that “automatically connects to the wireless internet of 
his . . . subway, local coffee shop, or park.”318 As this discussion 
demonstrates, the proposed framework avoids the ham-handed division 
between CSLI and everything else. Instead, courts are able to draw 
principled distinctions between automated technologies and metadata sets. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have sought to do four things. First, I have attempted 
to demonstrate that the conventional narrative of modern Fourth 
Amendment doctrine obscures the dominant and broadly significant role of 
the public/private distinction in limiting privacy protections, even to the 
point of subordinating property rights. Second, I have framed the third-
party doctrine as an application of the public/private distinction, eliminating 
an individual’s legitimate privacy interest in personal information disclosed 
or conveyed to service providers. Third, I have explored how three recent 
Supreme Court cases promise to subvert the dominant role of the 
public/private distinction, applying a more flexible, balancing approach that 
contemplates Fourth Amendment protection for certain categories of data, 
independent of physical location. Fourth, I have proposed an analytical 
framework that brings structure and clarity to the Court’s new approach. 
Lower courts have struggled to understand and apply the Supreme 
Court’s recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to other technologies. In 
317 Id. at 2217. 
318 Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 368. 
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the absence of clear guidance from the Court, most have narrowly confined 
these new cases to their precise facts, returning instead to a misconceived 
Katz analysis. Others have persevered but the results have been uneven and 
often contradictory. 
This Article brings coherence to the difficult process of developing 
workable rules that adequately capture the Court’s intended approach to 
difficult questions of digital privacy. It begins by reframing modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence so as to illuminate the significance of recent 
cases. These cases are explored in depth, drawing out the basic structure of 
the Court’s analysis and identifying those factors relevant to its balancing 
approach. Situating those factors in the broader analysis, a three-step 
framework is then proposed—to be used by lower courts as they develop 
bright-line rules for each of the different categories of data generated by 
digital technologies and services. 
